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Quantum data hiding in the presence of noise
Cosmo Lupo, Mark M. Wilde, and Seth Lloyd
Abstract—When classical or quantum information is broadcast
to separate receivers, there exist codes that encrypt the encoded
data such that the receivers cannot recover it when performing
local operations and classical communication, but they can
decode reliably if they bring their systems together and perform a
collective measurement. This phenomenon is known as quantum
data hiding and hitherto has been studied under the assumption
that noise does not affect the encoded systems. With the aim of
applying the quantum data hiding effect in practical scenarios,
here we define the data-hiding capacity for hiding classical
information using a quantum channel. Using this notion, we
establish a regularized upper bound on the data hiding capacity
of any quantum broadcast channel, and we prove that coherent-
state encodings have a strong limitation on their data hiding
rates. We then prove a lower bound on the data hiding capacity
of channels that map the maximally mixed state to the maximally
mixed state (we call these channels “mictodiactic”—they can be
seen as a generalization of unital channels when the input and
output spaces are not necessarily isomorphic) and argue how to
extend this bound to generic channels and to more than two
receivers.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of theoretical quantum information
science is to identify significant separations between the
classical and quantum theories of information. Many grand
successes in this spirit have already been achieved: Bell
inequalities [1], unconditionally secure communication [2],
quantum teleportation [3], super-dense coding [4], communi-
cation complexity [5], quantum data locking [6], and so on.
Another such notable example is the quantum data hiding
effect [7], [8], [9], [10]. Quantum data hiding is a commu-
nication protocol that allows for the encoding of classical or
quantum information into a two-party system such that the
information can be decoded if the systems are located in
the same physical laboratory, whereas the information cannot
be decoded if the systems are located in spatially separated
laboratories, even if the laboratories are allowed to exchange
classical messages. Such a task is impossible in the classical
world, simply because the exchange of a classical message
from one laboratory to the other allows for sending the entire
classical system, such that it is subsequently located in the
same physical laboratory and can thus be decoded. Arguing
from the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, quantum
data hiding allows for the encoding of information such that
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it is indistinguishable by local measurements and classical
communication and one instead requires a global measurement
to distinguish the states (i.e., information can be “hidden” in
this way).
The original proposal for quantum data hiding was an
impressive observation [7], the idea being to hide information
in Bell states such that it can be recovered by a joint quantum
operation but not by local operations and classical communi-
cation. The scheme from [7] has a low rate of hiding, and a
quantum optical implementation was suggested. However, the
proposal rested on there not being any loss or noise in the sys-
tem and was thus impractical in several regards. Nevertheless,
this striking phenomenon prompted further research, which
eventually culminated in the high-rate schemes of [11]. These
schemes relied upon the use of collective random unitary
operations to hide both classical and quantum data, invoking
mathematical techniques such as the concentration of measure.
The newly proposed schemes still required no loss or noise
in the encoded systems, which exclude their application in
practice. These schemes were later extended to the case of
hiding information from multiple parties [12].
Even though this fascinating protocol has been discussed for
some years now in the literature and a variety of applications
are now known, no one (as far as we are aware) has yet to
consider the most pertinent practical question: Is quantum data
hiding possible in the presence of noise and loss, and if so,
what is its performance? Here, we address this fundamental
question using the language of quantum Shannon theory and
recently developed techniques that have established quantum
data locking protocols in the presence of noise [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17] (see also [18] for another advance in the same
direction). The channels of primary interest to us are those
which have the property of mapping the maximally mixed
state in the input space into the maximally mixed state in the
output space. We called these channels mictodiactic (literally,
Greek for “mixtures passing through”) as they preserve the
maximally mixed state. Mictodiactic channels coincide with
unital channels if the input and output space have the same
dimension. We focus on these channels mainly because they
are relatively simple to analyze.
The main development of this paper begins with a formal
definition of the data hiding capacity of a quantum broadcast
channel. From there, we establish a regularized upper bound
on the data hiding capacity of any broadcast channel, and we
then show that coherent-state protocols cannot offer a high
rate of data hiding (this is perhaps to be expected, given
that coherent states are “pseudo-classical” and in light of our
prior work in which we showed that they do not offer high
rates for quantum data locking [13]). We next establish a
lower bound on the data hiding capacity of a mictodiactic
quantum broadcast channel and argue that this scheme can be
2extended to generic channels and to a multipartite scenario.
The scheme involves random coding arguments, and we invoke
concentration of measure bounds in order to establish security
of the scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here we recall some basic facts before beginning the main
development. A quantum state is represented by a density
operator, which is a positive semi-definite operator acting on
a Hilbert space H and with trace equal to one. A multipartite
quantum state acts on a tensor product of Hilbert spaces. A
classical-quantum state ρXB has the following form:
ρXB ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB, (1)
where pX is a probability distribution, {|x〉X} is an orthonor-
mal basis, and {ρxB} is a set of quantum states. A quantum
channel is modeled as a completely positive, trace-preserving
linear map, taking operators acting on one Hilbert space to
operators acting on another one. A quantum channel is unital
if it preserves the identity operator (note that the input and
output space of such a channel must have the same dimension).
A quantum measurement is a special kind of quantum channel
which accepts a quantum input system and outputs a classical
system. That is, it can be described as follows:
M(ρ) =
∑
y
Tr {Λyρ} |y〉〈y|, (2)
where Λy ≥ 0 for all y, ∑y Λy = I , and {|y〉} is some known
orthonormal basis. The collection {Λy} is called a positive
operator-valued measure (POVM). A quantum instrument is a
quantum channel that accepts a quantum input and outputs a
quantum system and a classical system.
A quantum broadcast channel is defined as a quantum
channel that accepts one input quantum system A and has
two output quantum systems B and C [19]. Formally, it is
a completely positive trace preserving linear map from the
space of operators that act on the Hilbert space for system A
to the space of operators acting on the tensor-product Hilbert
space for systems B and C. An important example of such
a channel is one that mixes an input mode with two vacuum
states at two beamsplitters such that the two receivers obtain
two of the beamsplitter outputs while the environment obtains
the other mode [20], [21]. One could incorporate noise effects
in addition to loss by mixing with thermal states instead of
vacuum states.
The class of local operations and classical communication
(LOCC) consists of compositions of the following operations:
1) Alice performs a quantum instrument, which has both a
quantum and classical output. She forwards the classical
output to Bob, who then performs a quantum channel
conditioned on the classical data received.
2) The situation is reversed, with Bob performing the initial
instrument, who forwards the classical data to Alice,
who then performs a quantum channel conditioned on
the classical data.
An LOCC measurement is a measurement channel that can
be implemented by means of local operations and classical
communication. Every LOCC channel can be written in the
following form (as a separability preserving channel):
LAB(ρAB) =
∑
x
(CxA ⊗DxB) ρAB (CxA ⊗DxB)† , (3)
such that
∑
x (C
x
A ⊗DxB)† (CxA ⊗DxB) = IAB . However, not
every channel of the form above is an LOCC channel [22].
The trace norm of an operator A is defined as ‖A‖1 ≡
Tr[
√
A†A], and it induces the trace distance ‖ρ− σ‖1 as a
measure of distinguishability between two quantum states ρ
and σ. The von Neumann entropy of a state ρ on system A is
equal to S(A)ρ ≡ S(ρ) ≡ −Tr[ρ log ρ]. The quantum mutual
information of a bipartite state ρAB is defined as
I(A;B)ρ ≡ S(A)ρ + S(B)ρ − S(AB)ρ. (4)
The LOCC accessible information of a classical-quantum-
quantum state ρMBC is as follows:
Iacc,LOCC(M ;BC)ρ ≡ max
LBC→Mˆ∈LOCC
I(M ; Mˆ)ω, (5)
where the mutual information on the RHS is with respect to
the following classical-classical state:
ωMMˆ ≡ LBC→Mˆ (ρMBC), (6)
and LBC→Mˆ is an LOCC measurement channel.
III. QUANTUM DATA HIDING CAPACITY
In a quantum data-hiding protocol, the sender Alice com-
municates classical or quantum information to two spatially
separated receivers Bob and Charlie via a quantum broadcast
channel NA→BC . The protocol satisfies the “correctness prop-
erty” if Bob and Charlie can decode reliably when allowed
to apply a joint quantum measurement (i.e., if they are
located in the same laboratory). On the other hand, the “data-
hiding/security property” is that the transmitted information
cannot be accessed by Bob and Charlie when they are re-
stricted to performing local operations and classical communi-
cation (i.e., if they are in different laboratories connected by a
classical communication channel). When Alice sends classical
information, we call this a bit-hiding protocol and define it as
follows:
Definition 1 (Bit-hiding protocol): An (n,M, δ, ε) bit-
hiding protocol for a quantum broadcast channel NA→BC
consists of a collection of input states {ρ(x)}x=1,...,M , and a
decoding measurement satisfying the following properties:
• (Correctness) It is possible to decode with high average
success probability, that is,
1
M
∑
x
Tr
[
ΛxBnCnN⊗nA→BC(ρ(x))
] ≥ 1− δ , (7)
where {ΛxBnCn} is the POVM associated to the decoding
measurement.
• (Security) For all LOCC measurements MLOCC on the
bipartite system BnCn, there exists a state σBnCn such
that
1
M
∑
x
∥∥MLOCC(N⊗nA→BC(ρ(x)) − σBnCn)∥∥1 ≤ ε .
(8)
3Remark 1: Due to the convexity of the trace norm, it is
sufficient to prove the security property against rank-one
LOCC measurements.
We can now define the bit-hiding capacity of a quantum
broadcast channel NA→BC :
Definition 2 (Bit-hiding capacity): A bit-hiding rate R is
achievable for a quantum broadcast channel NA→BC if for
all δ, ε, ζ ∈ (0, 1) and sufficiently large n, there exists an
(n,M, δ, ε) bit-hiding protocol such that 1n logM ≥ R − ζ.
The bit-hiding capacity κ(N ) of N is equal to the supremum
of all achievable bit-hiding rates.
In this paper we focus on bit-hiding protocols. One can
also define qubit-hiding protocols, aimed at hiding quantum
information (see [11]). Similarly, one could define a notion
of qubit-hiding capacity of a quantum channel. Additionally,
these definitions immediately generalize to the case of a
channel with one sender and an arbitrary number of receivers.
IV. REGULARIZED UPPER BOUND ON QUANTUM DATA
HIDING CAPACITY
We begin by establishing a regularized upper bound on the
bit-hiding capacity of any channel:
Theorem 1: The bit-hiding capacity κ(N ) of a quantum
channel N is bounded from above as follows:
κ(N ) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
κ(u)(N⊗n), (9)
where
κ(u)(N ) ≡ max
{pX (x),ρx}
[I(X ;BC)ρ − Iacc,LOCC(X ;BC)ρ] ,
ρXBC ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗NA→BC(ρx). (10)
Proof: This upper bound follows by using the definition
of a bit-hiding protocol and a few well known facts. Let
us consider an (n,M, δ, ε) bit hiding protocol. By a simple
reduction (see Appendix A), the correctness criterion in (7)
translates to the following criterion:
1
2
∥∥ΦMM ′ − ωMM ′∥∥1 ≤ δ, (11)
where ΦMM ′ is a maximally correlated state, defined as
ΦMM ′ ≡ 1
M
∑
x
|x〉〈x|M ⊗ |x〉〈x|M ′ , (12)
and ωMM ′ is defined from the probability distribution on the
LHS of (7) as∑
x,x′
1
M
Tr
[
Λx
′
BnCnN⊗nA→BC(ρ(x))
]
|x〉〈x|M ⊗ |x′〉〈x′|M ′ .
(13)
Then
logM = I(M ;M ′)Φ (14)
≤ I(M ;M ′)ω + f(n, δ) (15)
≤ I(M ;BnCn)ω + f(n, δ). (16)
The first inequality is an application of the Alicki-Fannes
continuity of entropy inequality [23], with f(n, δ) a func-
tion such that limδ→0 limn→∞ 1nf(n, δ) = 0. The second
inequality is a consequence of the Holevo bound [24], where
we have denoted the state after the channel (but before the
decoding measurement) again by ω. As a consequence of the
security criterion in (8) and the Alicki-Fannes inequality, we
can conclude that
Iacc,LOCC(M ;B
nCn) ≤ g(n, ε), (17)
with g(n, ε) a function such that limε→0 limn→∞ 1ng(n, ε) =
0. So this gives
logM ≤ I(M ;BnCn)− Iacc,LOCC(M ;BnCn)
+ f(n, δ) + g(n, ε). (18)
We finally optimize over all possible channel inputs, divide by
n, take the limit as n→∞ and then as ε, δ → 0 to establish
the statement of the theorem.
V. UPPER BOUND FOR COHERENT-STATE DATA-HIDING
PROTOCOLS
Here we show that data-hiding schemes making use of
coherent-state encodings are highly limited in terms of the
rate at which they can hide information. We assume that
the mean input photon number is less than NS ∈ (0,∞)
and Alice is connected to Bob and Charlie by a bosonic
broadcast channel [20], in which Alice has access to one
input port of a beamsplitter, the vacuum is injected into the
other input port, and Bob and Charlie have access to the
outputs of the beamsplitter. The main idea behind the bound
that we prove here is that the classical capacity of the pure-
loss bosonic channel is limited from above by g(NS) [25],
where g(x) ≡ (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1) − x log2 x. At the same
time, if Bob and Charlie perform heterodyne detection on their
outputs and coordinate their results, the rate at which they can
decode information is equal to log2(1+NS). Our proof of the
following theorem makes this intuition rigorous. Notably, this
bound is the same as that found in [13] for the strong locking
capacity when using coherent-state encodings.
Theorem 2: The quantum data-hiding capacity of a bosonic
broadcast channel when restricting to coherent-state encodings
with mean photon number NS is bounded from above by
g(NS)− log2(1 +NS) ≤ log2(e) ≈ 1.45.
Proof: Consider a quantum data-hiding scheme consisting
of coherent-state codewords: {|αn(x, k)〉}x,k, where |αn〉 ≡
|α1〉⊗|α2〉⊗· · ·⊗|αn〉 and such that the mean photon number
of the scheme is less than NS ∈ (0,∞). Then the quantum
codeword transmitted for message x is as follows:
ρ(x) ≡ 1
K
∑
k
|αn(x, k)〉〈αn(x, k)|. (19)
So the classical-quantum state corresponding to the transmitted
state is as follows:
ωMKBnCn ≡
1
MK
∑
x,k
|x〉〈x|M ⊗|k〉〈k|K⊗|√ηαn(x, k)〉 〈√ηαn(x, k)|Bn
⊗
∣∣∣√1− ηαn(x, k)〉〈√1− ηαn(x, k)∣∣∣
Cn
, (20)
4where
∣∣√ηαn〉 is a shorthand for ∣∣√ηα1〉⊗ ∣∣√ηα2〉⊗ · · · ⊗∣∣√ηαn〉.
In order to obtain our upper bound, we suppose that Bob
performs heterodyne detection, forwards the results to Charlie,
who also performs heterodyne detection and coordinates the
results to decode. Now begin from the upper bound in (18):
I(M ;BnCn)ω − Iacc,LOCC(M ;BnCn)ω
≤ I(M ;BnCn)ω − Ihet,LO(M ;BnCn)ω (21)
= I(MK;BnCn)ω − I(K;BnCn|M)ω
− [Ihet,LO(MK;BnCn)ω − Ihet,LO(K;BnCn|M)ω] (22)
= I(MK;BnCn)ω − Ihet,LO(MK;BnCn)ω
− [I(K;BnCn|M)ω − Ihet,LO(K;BnCn|M)ω] (23)
≤ I(MK;BnCn)ω − Ihet,LO(MK;BnCn)ω (24)
≤ max
pY (y)
[I(Y ;BnCn)τ − Ihet,LO(Y ;BnCn)τ ] (25)
≤ n max
pY (y)
[I(Y ;BC)σ − Ihet,LO(Y ;BC)σ] . (26)
The first inequality follows by picking the LOCC measure-
ment to be the classically coordinated heterodyne detection
mentioned above. The first equality follows from the chain
rule for conditional mutual information, and the second equal-
ity is a rewriting. The second inequality follows because
I(K;BnCn|M)ω − Ihet,LO (K;BnCn|M)ω ≥ 0, which is
a consequence of data processing: the classical heterodyne
detection measurement outcomes are from measuring systems
BnCn. The second-to-last inequality follows by optimizing
over all input distributions and the information quantities are
evaluated with respect to a state of the following form:
τY BnCn ≡
∑
y
pY (y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ |√ηαn(y)〉 〈√ηαn(y)|Bn
⊗
∣∣∣√1− ηαn(y)〉〈√1− ηαn(y)∣∣∣
Cn
. (27)
The last inequality follows by realizing that the difference
between the mutual informations can be understood as be-
ing equal to the private information of a quantum wiretap
channel in which the state is prepared for the receiver while
the heterodyned version of this state (a classical variable)
is prepared for the eavesdropper. Such a quantum wiretap
channel has pure product input states (they are coherent states)
and it is degraded. Thus, we can apply Theorem 35 from [13]
to conclude that this private information is subadditive. The
information quantities in the last line are with respect to a
state of the following form:
σY BC ≡
∑
y
pY (y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ |√ηα (y)〉 〈√ηα(y)|B
⊗
∣∣∣√1− ηα(y)〉〈√1− ηα(y)∣∣∣
C
. (28)
Now by a development nearly identical to that given in
Eqs. (34)-(42) of [13], we can conclude that a circularly
symmetric, Gaussian mixture of coherent states with variance
NS optimizes the quantity in (26). For such a distribution, the
quantity I(Y ;BC)σ evaluates to
I(Y ;BC)σ = g(NS). (29)
We now evaluate the quantity Ihet,LO(Y ;BC)σ . Consider that
the output for Bob is a random variable √ηα+ zB , where α
is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable (RV) with variance
NS and zB is a zero-mean Gaussian RV with variance 1. The
output for Charlie is a RV
√
1− ηα + zC , where α is the
same Gaussian RV as above and zC is a zero-mean Gaussian
RV with variance 1 (note that α, zB , and zC are independent
RVs). The covariance matrix for the real part of these RVs is
as follows:[
ηNS/2 + 1/2
√
η (1− η)NS/2√
η (1− η)NS/2 (1− η)NS/2 + 1/2
]
, (30)
with determinant equal to
1
4
(NS + 1). (31)
The determinant of the covariance matrix of the real parts of
the RVs zB and zC is equal to 1/4. By modeling the real and
imaginary components as two independent parallel channels
and plugging into the Shannon formula for the capacity of a
Gaussian channel, we find that
Ihet,LO(Y ;BC)σ = log(NS + 1). (32)
So we can finally conclude the upper bound on the data hiding
capacity of coherent-state schemes.
VI. LOWER BOUND ON QUANTUM DATA HIDING CAPACITY
Here we prove a lower bound for the bit-hiding capacity
of mictodiactic quantum broadcast channels. We consider a
channelNA→BC from an input quantum system of dimensions
dimA = dA to the output systems with dimensions dimB =
dB and dimC = dC . A mictodiactic channel is defined from
the following property:
NA→BC(IA/dA) = IBC/(dBdC), (33)
where IA and IBC denote the identity operators acting on the
input and output spaces, respectively.
Theorem 3: The bit-hiding capacity κ(N ) of a mictodiactic
broadcast channel NA→BC , with dimA = dA, dimB = dB
and dimC = dC is bounded from below as follows:
κ(N ) ≥ κ(l)(N ) ≡ χ(N )− log d+ − log γ . (34)
where
χ(N ) = S
(∫
dψ N (ψ)
)
−
∫
dψ S(N (ψ)) (35)
is the Holevo information of the channel computed for a uni-
form ensemble of input states (dψ denotes the uniform mea-
sure on the sphere of unit vectors), and d+ = max {dB, dC}.
The parameter γ is given by
γ =
2d2Bd
2
C
dA(dA + 1)
‖(N ⊗N )(Psym)‖∞ , (36)
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the ∞-norm and Psym is the projector onto
the symmetric subspace.
A proof is given in the next section.
5As an example consider the d-dimensional depolarizing
channel, with d = dA = dBdC :
N (X) = pX + (1− p)Tr(X)I/d. (37)
Let us first compute the Holevo information for the uni-
form distribution of input states. A straightforward calculation
yields
χ(N ) = log d+
(
p+
1− p
d
)
log
(
p+
1− p
d
)
+ (d− 1)
(
1− p
d
)
log
(
1− p
d
)
. (38)
Then consider the density matrix PsymTr(Psym) = 2
Psym
d(d+1) , which
is mapped by (N ⊗N ) into
(N⊗N )
(
Psym
Tr(Psym)
)
= p2
Psym
Tr(Psym)
+(1−p2)I ⊗ I
d2
, (39)
where we have used the fact that the partial trace of PsymTr(Psym)
is the maximally mixed state I/d. We hence have
‖(N ⊗N )(Psym)‖∞
= Tr(Psym)
∥∥∥∥(N ⊗N )( PsymTr(Psym)
)∥∥∥∥
∞
(40)
=
d(d + 1)
2
(
2p2
d(d + 1)
+
1− p2
d2
)
(41)
=
d+ 1
2d
+ p2
(
1− d+ 1
2d
)
. (42)
Finally, from (36), putting dBdC = d we obtain
γ = 1 + p2
(
2d
d+ 1
− 1
)
. (43)
For the case of unital channels, which are contrac-
tive with respect to the Schatten norms [26], we have
‖(N ⊗N )(Psym)‖∞ ≤ ‖Psym‖∞ = 1, from which we obtain
the following looser bound:
κ(l)(N ) ≥ χ(N )− log d+ − log 2d
d+ 1
. (44)
A. Proof of Theorem 3
We now provide a proof for Theorem 3. We generate a
bit-hiding code for n uses of the quantum broadcast channel
NA→BC , by employing the well known method of random
coding. For x = 1, . . . ,M , pick a collection of M pure
quantum states at random, each having the following form:
|ψ(x)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|ψj(x)〉. (45)
These random unit vectors are each generated by sampling
|ψj(x)〉 independently from the uniform distribution over the
unit sphere in Cd. A simple way of doing so is to single out a
fiducial unit vector |0〉 ∈ Cd and pick a unitary Vxj at random
according to the Haar measure on SU(d), in order to generate
|ψj(x)〉 = Vxj |0〉. Let
Vx =
n⊗
j=1
Vxj . (46)
We then pick Kn qudit unitaries Ukj i.i.d. from the Haar
measure on SU(d). The inputs to the channel have the
following form:
ρ(x) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Uk ψ(x)U
†
k , (47)
where
Uk =
n⊗
j=1
Ukj . (48)
We introduce the notation V = (V1, . . . , VM ) to denote
the M -tuple of n-local qudit unitaries and the notation U =
(U1, . . . , UK) to denote the K-tuple of n-local qudit unitaries,
and we further define RU as follows:
RU(σ) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
Uk σ U
†
k . (49)
We also define the random variables V and U , taking values
on the set of M -tuples V = (V1, . . . , VM ) and K-tuples
U = (U1, . . . , UK), respectively, where each qudit unitary is
statistically independent and uniformly distributed according
to the distribution induced by the Haar measure on SU(d).
Given the input codewords in (47), the state at the output
of n channel uses is as follows:
N⊗n(ρ(x)) = N⊗n(RU(ψ(x))) (50)
= N⊗n(RU(Vx|0〉〈0|Vx)) . (51)
We split the proof into two parts: first we prove the
correctness property and then the security property.
1) Correctness: The proof of the correctness property has
a rather standard form, but we provide it for completeness. Let
Πn,δ0N (π) denote the δ0-weakly typical projection for the tensor-
power state [N (π)]⊗n, where π denotes the maximally mixed
state and δ0 > 0 (see, e.g., [27] for a definition and properties).
This projector has the following properties which hold for all
ε0 ∈ (0, 1) and sufficiently large n:
Tr(Πn,δ0N (π) [N (π)]⊗n) ≥ 1− ε0, (52)
Πn,δ0N (π) [N (π)]⊗nΠn,δ0N (π) ≤ 2−[S(N (π))−δ0]Πn,δ0N (π). (53)
Let a spectral decomposition of the state N⊗n(Uk ψ(x)U †k )
be as follows:
N⊗n(Uk ψ(x)U †k) =
∑
yn
p (yn|k, x) ∣∣ynk,x〉 〈ynk,x∣∣ , (54)
where the eigenvalues p (yn|k, x) form a product distribution
because the state is tensor product. Let Πn,δ1k,x denote the δ1-
weak conditionally typical projection corresponding to the
state N⊗n(Uk ψ(x)U †k ), defined as the projection onto the
following subspace:
span
{∣∣ynk,x〉 : ∣∣∣∣− 1n log p (yn|k, x)− S∗
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ1} . (55)
where δ1 > 0 and S∗ =
∫
dψ S(N (ψ)) (see, e.g., [27] for
more details). These projectors have the following property,
which holds for all ε1 ∈ (0, 1) and sufficiently large n:
EUk,Vx
{
Tr
(
Πn,δ1k,x N⊗n(Ukψ(x)U †k )
)}
≥ 1− ε1. (56)
6(In fact, both ε0 and ε1 can be taken to be exponentially
decreasing in n, following from an application of the Chernoff
bound.) So this means that we can build a reliable decoding
measurement from the set {Πk,x} of projectors. Another
property of the conditionally typical projector is the following
bound on the size of each projector:
Tr(Πn,δ1k,x ) ≤ 2n[S∗+δ1]. (57)
We then consider a “square-root” decoding measurement
defined by the following POVM elements:
Λk,x ≡
∑
k′,x′
Γk′,x′
−1/2 Γk,x
∑
k′,x′
Γk′,x′
−1/2 , (58)
Γk,x ≡ Πn,δ0N (π)Πn,δ1k,x Πn,δ0N (π). (59)
The average probability of an error when decoding both x and
k is as follows:
p¯err = 1− 1
MK
∑
k,x
Tr(Λk,xN⊗n(ψk(x))), (60)
where we have introduced the shorthand ψk(x) ≡ Ukψ(x)U †k .
Recall the Hayashi-Nagoaka operator inequality [28]
I − (P +Q)−1/2 P (P +Q)−1/2 ≤ 2 (I − P ) + 4Q, (61)
which holds for 0 ≤ P ≤ I and Q ≥ 0. Picking
P = Γk,x, Q =
∑
(k′,x′) 6=(k,x)
Γk′,x′ , (62)
we can apply this to (60) to bound it from above as
p¯err ≤ 2
MK
∑
k,x
Tr([I − Γk,x]N⊗n(ψk(x)))
+
4
MK
∑
k,x
∑
(k′,x′) 6=(k,x)
Tr(Γk′,x′N⊗n(ψk(x))). (63)
Now taking an expectation over a random choice of both V
and U , by (52) and (56) and the gentle measurement lemma
[29], [30] (see also [27]), it follows that
EV,U
[
Tr([I − Γk,x]N⊗n(ψk(x)))
] ≤ 2√ε0 + ε1. (64)
Recalling that each unitary is independent of another, for
(k′, x′) 6= (k, x), we find that
EV,U
[
Tr(Γk′,x′N⊗n(ψk(x)))
]
= Tr(EV,U [Γk′,x′ ]EV,U
[N⊗n(ψk(x))]) (65)
= Tr(EV,U [Γk′,x′ ] [N (π)]⊗n) (66)
= EV,U Tr(Π
n,δ1
k′,x′Π
n,δ0
N (π) [N (π)]⊗nΠn,δ0N (π)) (67)
≤ 2−[S(N (π))−δ0]Tr(Πn,δ1k′,x′Πn,δ0N (π)) (68)
≤ 2−[S(N (π))−δ0]Tr(Πn,δ1k′,x′) (69)
≤ 2−[S(N (π))−δ0]2n[S∗+δ1]. (70)
Putting everything together, we find that
EV,U [p¯err] ≤ 2 [2√ε0 + ε1]
+ 4KM2−[S(N (π))−δ0]2n[S∗+δ1]. (71)
By picking
1
n
logM +
1
n
logK = S (N (π)) − S∗ − 2δ0 − 2δ1, (72)
we can ensure that
EV,U [p¯err] ≤ 2 [2√ε0 + ε1] + 4 · 2−n(δ0+δ1). (73)
Eventually, we will derandomize the random bit-hiding code
in order to conclude the existence of one with this error
probability bound.
2) Security: To simplify the notation we set d = dBdC .
To prove the security of the protocol against an LOCC
measurement we show that
1
M
∑
x
∥∥MLOCC (N⊗nA→BC(ρ(x)) − I⊗n/dn)∥∥1 ≤ ε2 ,
(74)
for an arbitrarily small ε2 ∈ (0, 1) and for all LOCC mea-
surements. In fact, what we show is an even stronger bound
by proving that the protocol is secure against all separable
measurements Msep.
For a given codeword ψ(x) and a separable measurement
Msep (with POVM elements {By⊗Cy}), we define the con-
ditional random variable Y |U from the following distribution:
pY |U(y) = Tr[(B
y ⊗ Cy)N⊗n(RU(ψ(x)))] . (75)
We then consider the mutual information of the random
variables Y and U , given that codeword ψ(x) was transmitted:
I(Y ;U) = H(Y )−H(Y |U) . (76)
We first consider the case of separable projective mea-
surements Mpro-sep, which have separable POVM elements
By⊗Cy = φyB⊗φyC , where φyB and φyC are rank-one projectors
acting on Bob and Charlie’s systems, respectively. By applying
concentration inequalities to the conditional probability distri-
bution pY |U(y), we show that (see Appendix B for details)
for K ≫ K(n, dB, dC , δ2)
sup
x,Mpro-sep
I(Y ;U) = O(δ2 log d
n) , (77)
where δ2 ∈ (0, 1) and
K(n, dB, dC , δ2) = 8d
n
+γ
nδ−22 log
10dn
δ2
, (78)
with d+ = max {dB, dC}.
The Pinsker inequality (see, e.g., [31]) states that
‖pY,U − pY pU‖1 =
∫
dU
∑
y
∣∣pY |U(y)− pY (y)∣∣
≤
√
2 ln 2I(Y ;U) . (79)
Using (77) and the Pinsker inequality we then obtain that for
all M codewords ψ(x) and Mpro-sep∫
dU
∥∥Mpro-sep (N (RU(ψ(x))) − I⊗n/dn)∥∥1
=
∫
dU
∑
y
∣∣pY |U(y)− pY (y)∣∣ ≤ O(√δ2 log dn) . (80)
7Taking an average over all messages and exchanging this
average with the expectation over unitaries, we find that
EV,U
{
1
M
∑
x
∥∥Mpro-sep (N (RU(ψ(x))) − I⊗n/dn)∥∥1
}
≤ O(
√
δ2 log dn). (81)
Then, in Appendix C we show how this result can be
extended to the case of generic separable measurements by
applying some techniques developed in [32].
Finally, by choosing
1
n
logK = log d+ + log γ + λ
log n
n
, (82)
where λ > 0 is a positive constant, the condition K >
K(n, dB, dC , δ2) is satisfied and implies that the LHS of (81)
decreases sub-exponentially in n.
To conclude the proof we combine the conditions (72) and
(82) to obtain that as long as the rate satisfies the following
condition
1
n
logM = S (N (π)) − S∗ − log d+
− log γ − λ log n
n
− 2δ0 − 2δ1, (83)
then (73) and (81) are satisfied. This in turn implies that there
exist choices of the unitaries (U1, . . . , UK) and (V1, . . . , VM )
such that these conditions are satisfied and thus there exists
an (n,M, δ, ε) bit-hiding code such that δ and ε are vanishing
with increasing n. The asymptotic rate of the generated
sequence of codes is then as given in the statement of the
theorem.
B. Multipartite Generalization
The result of Theorem 3 is readily generalized to a multipar-
tite setting. Suppose for instance that Alice sends information
from a system of dimension dA through a mictodiactic channel
N to ℓ receivers, B1, . . . , Bℓ, with Hilbert space dimensions
dj = dimBj , and we require security against LOCC measure-
ments. In this case we would obtain the following achievable
bit-hiding rate:
χ(N )− log d+ − log γ , (84)
with d+ = maxj dj and
γ =
2
∏
j d
2
j
dA(dA + 1)
∥∥N⊗2(Psym)∥∥∞ . (85)
VII. DISCUSSION
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a formal
definition of the data hiding capacity of a quantum channel
and upper and lower bounds on this operational quantity. Our
work thus initiates the study of “noisy data hiding,” and we
now suggest several directions for future study.
It could be possible to generalize Theorem 3 such that it
applies to generic, non-mictodiactic, channels. Now we show
how this generalization is obtained assuming two unproven
statements. We notice that the mictodiactic condition is used
only to obtain (111), that is,
EU (Xk) =
1
dn
. (86)
where
Xk = Tr
(
φyN⊗n(Ukψ(x)U †k)
)
. (87)
The vector φy corresponds to one of the POVM elements of
a decoding measurement.
The first unproven statement is that, for n large, φy belongs
to the typical subspace associated toN⊗n(EU (Ukψ(x)U †k )) =
N⊗n(π⊗nA ) = N (πA)⊗n, where πA = IA/dA denotes
the maximally mixed state on system A. Let Πn,δN (πA) then
denote the projector onto the typical subspace. Putting φy =
Πn,δN (πA)φ
yΠn,δN (πA), we have
EU (Xk) = Tr
(
φyΠn,δN (πA)N⊗n(πA)Π
n,δ
N (πA)
)
. (88)
The equipartition property of the typical subspace (see e.g.
[27]) yields
2−n(S+δ)Πn,δN (πA) ≤ Π
n,δ
N (πA)
N⊗n(πA)Πn,δN (πA)
≤ 2−n(S−δ)Πn,δN (πA) , (89)
with S = S(N (πA)). This in turn implies
2−n(S+δ) = 2−n(S+δ) Tr
(
φyΠn,δN (πA)
)
≤ EU (Xk)
≤ 2−n(S−δ)Tr
(
φyΠn,δN (πA)
)
= 2−n(S−δ) . (90)
These bounds generalize the condition (111), where 2S re-
places dBdC and plays the role of the effective dimension of
the output system.
Similarly, consider the second moment, see (115),
EU (X
2
k) = Tr
[
φy⊗2
(
N⊗2
(
Psym
Tr(Psym)
))⊗n]
. (91)
The second unproven statement is that the measurement
vectors are of the form φy⊗2 = Πn,δN⊗2(Psym)φ
y⊗2Πn,δN⊗2(Psym),
where Πn,δN⊗2(Psym) is the typical projector associated to the
state N⊗2
(
Psym
TrPsym
)
. The equipartition property implies
Tr
[
φy⊗2Πn,δN⊗2(Psym)
(
N⊗2
(
Psym
TrPsym
))⊗n
Πn,δN⊗2(Psym)
]
≤ 2−n(S2−δ) , (92)
where S2 = S(N⊗2( PsymTrPsym )).
In conclusion, by modifying (116), it could be possible
to extend Theorem 3 to non-mictodiactic (and non-unital)
channels with γ redefined as(
EU (X
2
k)
EU (Xk)2
) 1
n
≤
(
2−n(S2−δ)
2−2n(S+δ)
) 1
n
= 22S−S2+3δ =: γ .
(93)
Notice that this extension of Theorem 3 also improves the
bound for mictodiactic channels. We leave a full development
of the above observations for future work.
8There are several ways in which the lower bound of Theo-
rem 3 could be further improved. Let us recall that a map R
is said to be an approximately randomizing map with respect
to a given norm ‖ · ‖∗, if for all states ψ,
‖R(ψ)− π‖∗ ≤ ε , (94)
where π is the maximally mixed state. There exists a close
relation between data-hiding protocols and approximately ran-
domizing maps. For instance, the data-hiding protocol of [11]
was obtained by modifying a related approximately random-
izing map with respect to the operator norm ‖ · ‖∞. Several
constructions of approximately randomizing maps with respect
to the operator norm and the trace norm were discussed in [33],
[34], [35], [36]. It could indeed be possible that these maps
can be used to develop quantum data hiding protocols robust
to noise and achieving higher rates. If this is true, it might be
possible to achieve a bit-hiding rate of
χ(N )− log d+ . (95)
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APPENDIX A
Let M be a random variable. Let pMM ′ denote the distri-
bution in which M ′ is a copy of M , so that
pMM ′ (m,m
′) = pM (m)δm,m′ . (96)
Let qMM ′ denote the distribution that results from sending
random variable M ′ through a channel qM ′|M (m′|m), so that
qMM ′ (m,m
′) = pM (m)qM ′|M (m
′|m). (97)
Then the probability that M ′ 6= M under qMM ′ is equal to
the normalized trace distance between pMM ′ and qMM ′ :
Pr
q
{M ′ 6= M} = 1
2
‖pMM ′ − qMM ′‖1 . (98)
Consider that
Pr
q
{M ′′ 6= M} =
∑
m′ 6=m
qMM ′(m,m
′) (99)
=
∑
m′ 6=m
pM (m)qM ′|M (m
′|m). (100)
Consider also that
‖pMM ′ − qMM ′‖1
=
∑
m,m′
∣∣pM (m)δm,m′ − pM (m)qM ′|M (m′|m)∣∣ (101)
=
∑
m,m′
pM (m)
∣∣δm,m′ − qM ′|M (m′|m)∣∣ (102)
=
∑
m 6=m′
pM (m)qM ′|M (m
′|m)
+
∑
m
pM (m)
[
1− qM ′|M (m|m)
] (103)
= 2
∑
m 6=m′
pM (m)qM ′|M (m
′|m). (104)
So the equality in (98) follows from (99)–(100) and (101)–
(104).
APPENDIX B
CONCENTRATION INEQUALITIES
In a crucial passage in the proof of Theorem 3 we have
applied the bound
I(Y ;U) = O(δ log dn) , (105)
holding for any separable measurement. Here and in Appendix
C we prove that this bound holds true provided
K ≫ K(n, dB, dC , δ) = 8dn+γnδ−2 log
10dn
δ
, (106)
with γ as in (36).
We do so by first showing that (105) holds for separable pro-
jective measurements Mpro-sep, which have separable POVM
elements φyB ⊗φyC , where φyB and φyC are rank-one projectors
acting on Bob and Charlie’s systems, respectively. This is
done in Proposition 1, where we apply techniques analogous
to those applied in [15], [16]. In Appendix C we show how
this result can be extended to the case of generic separable
measurements by applying some techniques developed in [32].
We will make use of two concentration inequalities. The
first one is Maurer’s tail bound [37]:
Theorem 4: Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative
real-valued random variables, with Xk ∼ X and finite first
and second moments: E[X ],E[X2] <∞. Then, for any τ > 0
we have that
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk < E[X ]− τ
}
≤ exp
(
− Kτ
2
2E[X2]
)
. (107)
The second one is the Chernoff bound [38]:
Theorem 5: Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. random vari-
ables, Xk ∼ X , with 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 and E[X ] = µ. Then,
for any τ > 0 such that (1 + τ)µ ≤ 1 we have that
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk > (1 + τ)µ
}
≤ exp
(
−Kτ
2µ
4 ln 2
)
. (108)
For given states ψ(x) and φy = φyB ⊗ φyC , we apply these
bounds to the quantity
Xk = Tr
(
φyN⊗n(Ukψ(x)U †k)
)
. (109)
9This quantity is a random variable if the unitary Uk is chosen
randomly. Taking the average over the random unitaries Uk
we obtain
EU (Ukψ(x)U
†
k ) =
I⊗n
dnA
, (110)
which for mictodiactic channels implies
EU (Xk) =
1
dnBd
n
C
. (111)
We also consider the second moment
EU (X
2
k) =
∫
dUk Tr
[(
φyN⊗n(Ukψ(x)U †k)
)⊗2]
= Tr
φy⊗2 n⊗
j=1
N⊗2
(∫
dUkj U
⊗2
kj ψj(x)
⊗2U †kj
⊗2
) .
(112)
For any two-qudit pure state ρ we have∫
dU U⊗2ρ⊗2U †
⊗2
=
2
dA(dA + 1)
Psym , (113)
where Psym is the projector onto the symmetric subspace (see,
e.g., [39]). We then obtain
EU (X
2
k) =
[
2
dA(dA + 1)
]n
Tr
[
φy⊗2
(N⊗2 (Psym))⊗n]
(114)
≤
[
2
dA(dA + 1)
]n
‖N⊗2 (Psym) ‖n∞ (115)
(where we have used the fact that the expectation value of an
operator on a vector is upper bounded by the ∞-norm), from
which it follows(
EU (X
2
k)
EU (Xk)2
) 1
n
≤ 2d
2
Bd
2
C
dA(dA + 1)
‖N⊗2 (Psym) ‖∞ = γ .
(116)
We will also make use of the notion of a net of unit vectors
[11]. Let us recall that an ε-net is a finite set of unit vectors
Nε = {φ˜} in a D-dimensional Hilbert space such that for any
unit vector φ there exists φ˜ ∈ Nε for which
‖φ− φ˜‖1 ≤ ε . (117)
As discussed in [11] there exist ε-nets with less than (5/ε)2D
elements. Let us consider a pair of vectors φB , φC and the
corresponding vectors φ˜B , φ˜C in the net such that
‖φB − φ˜B‖1 , ‖φC − φ˜C‖1 ≤ ε . (118)
We consider the quantity defined in (75):
pY |U(y) = Tr[(φ
y
B ⊗ φyC)N⊗n(RU(ψ(x)))] , (119)
and
p˜Y |U(y) = Tr[
(
φ˜yB ⊗ φ˜yC
)
N⊗n(RU(ψ(x)))] . (120)
We have ∣∣pY |U(y)− p˜Y |U(y)∣∣ ≤ 2ε . (121)
Finally, we consider the function η( · ) = −( · ) log ( · ). Using
the inequality |η(r) − η(s)| ≤ η(|r − s|) (which holds for
|r − s| < 1/2) we obtain∣∣η(pY |U(y))− η(p˜Y |U(y))∣∣ ≤ η(2ε) . (122)
From now on, to make notation lighter, we put d := dBdC .
We are now ready to prove the following:
Proposition 1: For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and K >
K(n, dB, dC , δ),
sup
x,Mpro-sep
I(Y ;U) = O(δ log dn) , (123)
where the sup is over separable projective measurements
Mpro-sep.
First of all, we notice that for a projective measurement
with associated POVM elements {φy = φyB ⊗ φyC}y=1,...,dn
the mutual information (76) reads
I(Y ;U) = log dn −H(Y |U) , (124)
where we have also used the condition (111).
For a given vector ψ(x) and separable projective measure-
ment Mpro-sep we consider the quantity
H(Y )U = −
∑
y
pY |U(y) log pY |U(y) (125)
=
∑
y
η[pY |U(y)] . (126)
For a given y, we want to bound the probability that
H(Y )U ≤ (1 − δ) log dn. In order to do that we bound the
probability that η[pY |U(y)] ≤ η[ 1−δdn ]. Notice that η[x] is a
concave function and the equation η[x] = η[ 1−δdn ] has two
roots: x− = 1−δdn , and x+ = 1 − η[ 1−δdn ] + O(η[ 1−δdn ]), where
for dn large enough x+ ≥ 1− 2η[ 1−δdn ]. Therefore we have
PrU
{
η[pY |U(y)] ≤ 1− δ
dn
log dn
}
≤ PrU
{
pY |U(y) ≤ x−
}
+ PrU
{
pY |U(y) ≥ x+
}
≤ PrU
{
pY |U(y) ≤ 1− δ
dn
}
+ PrU
{
pY |U(y) ≥ 1− δ′
}
, (127)
where δ′ ≡ 2η[ 1−δdn ].
For given x and y, we now apply the Maurer tail bound
(Theorem 4) to the random variables
Xk := Tr
(
φyB ⊗ φyC N⊗n(Ukψ(x)U †k )
)
, (128)
whose first and second moments are given by (111) and (112)
and obey the inequality in (116). We remark that
1
K
∑
k
Xk = pY |U(y) . (129)
Hence, applying (107) with τ = δE[X ] = δ/dn, we obtain
PrU
{
pY |U(y) <
1− δ
dn
}
≤ exp
(
−Kδ
2
E[X ]2
2E[X2]
)
(130)
≤ exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
)
. (131)
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Similarly we apply the Chernoff inequality, Theorem 5, and
obtain
PrU
{
pY |U(y) ≥ 1− δ′
} ≤ exp(−Kdn(1− δ′ − 1/dn)2
4 ln 2
)
≤ exp
(
−Kd
n(1/2)2
4 ln 2
)
, (132)
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently small δ′ and
large dn. We then have
PrU
{
η(pY |U(y)) ≤ 1− δ
dn
log dn
}
≤ exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
)
+ exp
(
−Kd
n(1/2)2
4 ln 2
)
(133)
≤ 2 exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
)
, (134)
where the last inequality holds for any dn > 8 ln 2γ−nδ2.
This is true for given x and vectors φyB , φ
y
C . To account for
all possible codewords ψ(x) and measurement vectors φyB ,
φyC , we introduce a (δ2−1d−n)-net for Bob’s system and a
(δ2−1d−n)-net for Charlie’s one, containing in total no more
than (10dn/δ)2d
n
B+2d
n
C elements. Applying the union bound
on the net’s vectors and on the M codewords we obtain
Pr
{
inf
x,φ˜yB ,φ˜
y
C
η(pY |U(y)) ≤ 1− δdn log d
n
}
≤ 2M
(
10dn
δ
)2dnB+2dnC
exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
)
(135)
≤ 2M
(
10dn
δ
)4dn+
exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
)
(136)
≤ exp
(
−Kδ
2
2γn
+ 4dn+ log
10dn
δ
+ log (2M)
)
(137)
=: p , (138)
where d+ = max{dB, dC}. From this, we can extend the
infimum over all unit vectors by paying a small penalty given
by (122). In this way we obtain
Pr
{
inf
φy
B
,φy
C
η(pY |U(y)) ≤ 1− δ
dn
log dn − η(δd−n)
}
≤ p .
(139)
The probability of such a bad event can be made arbitrarily
small provided (we are assuming log (2M)≪ 4dn+ log 10d
n
δ )
K ≫ 8γndn+δ−2 log
10dn
δ
. (140)
Under this condition we then have that, up to a small proba-
bility p, for all separable projective measurements Mpro-sep,
H(Y )U ≥ (1− δ) log dn − dnη(δd−n) . (141)
This implies
H(Y |U) =
∫
dUH(Y )U (142)
≥
∫
dUH(Y )UΘ (143)
≥ [(1 − δ) log dn − dnη(δd−n)] (1− p) , (144)
where Θ ≡ Θ [H(Y )U − (1 − δ) log dn + dnη(δd−n)] de-
notes the Heaviside step function, which finally yields
sup
x,Mpro-sep
I(Y ;U) ≤ δ log dn + dnη(δd−n)
+
[
(1− δ) log dn − dnη(δd−n)] p
= O (δ log dn) . (145)
APPENDIX C
FROM PROJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS TO GENERIC
SEPARABLE MEASUREMENTS
In this appendix we discuss how Proposition 1 can be
extended to include generic separable measurements via the
notion of separable quasi-measurements. In order to do that
we apply a simple modification of Lemma 6.2 in [32].
The notion of quasi-measurement was defined in [32] :
Definition 3 (Quasi-Measurement [32]): We call (s, f)
quasi-measurement an incomplete measurement on a D-
dimensional system such that the associated POVM elements
are of the form D
2
s φ
y
, where φy , for y = 1, . . . , s, are
rank-one projectors and ∑sy=1 D2s φy ≤ f I . We denote asL(s, f) the set of (s, f)-separable quasi-measurements.
Lemma 6.2 in [32] proves that quasi-measurements are
almost as informative as generic measurements, that is, given
a bipartite quantum state ρUB we have
sup
M
‖M (ρUB − ρU ⊗ ρB)‖1
≤ sup
M′∈L(s,f)
‖M′ (ρUB − ρU ⊗ ρB)‖1
+ 4D2e−s(η−1)
2/(D(2 ln 2)) , (146)
where the sup on left hand side is over generic measurements
MB→Y on the B system, and that on the right hand side is
over quasi-measurements M′B→Y .
To apply this result to our setting, we first define the notion
of separable quasi-measurements by adapting Definition 3 to
the LOCC setting:
Definition 4: [Separable quasi-measurement] We say that
an incomplete measurement on a DB × DC -dimensional bi-
partite system is an (s, f)-separable quasi-measurement if the
associated POVM elements have the form (DBDC)
2
s φ
y
B ⊗ φyC ,
where φyB , φ
y
C , for y = 1, . . . , s, are rank-one projectors,
such that
∑s
y=1
(DBDC)
2
s φ
y
B ⊗ φyC ≤ f IBC . We denote as
Lsep(s, f) the set of (s, f)-separable quasi-measurements.
We notice that the proof in Appendix B, which considers
separable projective measurements, also applies to the case of
separable quasi-measurements. This implies that, by consider-
ing the set of (s, f)-separable quasi-measurements, a modified
version of Proposition 1 will be obtained, i.e.,
sup
x,M∈Lsep(s,f)
I(Y ;U) = O(δ log s). (147)
To move from separable quasi-measurements to generic sep-
arable measurements we apply a straightforward modification
11
of Lemma 6.2 in [32] in the LOCC setting, that is,
sup
Msep
‖M (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1
≤ sup
M′sep∈Lsep(s,f)
‖M′ (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1
+ 4(DBDC)
2e−s(η−1)
2/(DBDC(2 ln 2)) , (148)
where the sup on the left hand side is over separable measure-
ments MsepB,C→Y , and the one on the right is over separable
quasi-measurements M′sepB,C→Y .
In conclusion, to extend Proposition 1 to generic separable
measurements we proceed as follows. First recall that (see Eqs.
(79) and (80)) given a separable measurement Msep, in our
setting we have
‖Msep (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1 =∫
dU
∥∥Msep (N (RU(ψ(x))) − I⊗n/dn)∥∥1 . (149)
Then consider that Proposition 1, together with (79), states
that
sup
Mpro−sep
‖Mpro−sep (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1
≤ O(
√
δ log dn) , (150)
where the sup is over projective separable measurements. As
noticed above, Proposition 1 is straightforwardly extended
from projective separable measurements to separable quasi-
measurements, yielding
sup
M∈Lsep(s,f)
‖M (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1 ≤ O(
√
δ log s) .
(151)
Finally, using (148) with DB = dnB , DC = dnC , we obtain
sup
Msep
‖M (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1
≤ O(
√
δ log s) + 4(dBdC)
2ne−s(η−1)
2/(dnBd
n
C(2 ln 2)) .
(152)
Putting, for example, s = d2n and f = 1/2, yields
sup
Msep
‖M (ρUBC − ρU ⊗ ρBC)‖1
≤ O(
√
δ log d2n) + 4d2n exp
(
− d
n
8 ln 2
)
. (153)
This result can then be used to extend the security to the case
of generic separable measurements by paying a small penalty
not larger than 4d2n exp
(− dn8 ln 2).
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